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Abstract
Influence maximization is a widely used model for
information dissemination in social networks. Re-
cent work has employed such interventions across
a wide range of social problems, spanning public
health, substance abuse, and international develop-
ment (to name a few examples). A critical but un-
derstudied question is whether the benefits of such
interventions are fairly distributed across different
groups in the population; e.g., avoiding discrimina-
tion with respect to sensitive attributes such as race
or gender. Drawing on legal and game-theoretic
concepts, we introduce formal definitions of fair-
ness in influence maximization. We provide an al-
gorithmic framework to find solutions which sat-
isfy fairness constraints, and in the process improve
the state of the art for general multi-objective sub-
modular maximization problems. Experimental re-
sults on real data from an HIV prevention interven-
tion for homeless youth show that standard influ-
ence maximization techniques oftentimes neglect
smaller groups which contribute less to overall util-
ity, resulting in a disparity which our proposed al-
gorithms substantially reduce.
1 Introduction
Influence maximization in social networks is a well-studied
problem with applications in a broad range of domains. Con-
sider, for example, a group of at-risk youth; outreach pro-
grams try to provide as many people as possible with useful
information (e.g., HIV safety, or available health services).
Since resources (e.g., social workers) are limited, it is not pos-
sible to personally reach every at-risk individual. It is thus
important to target key community figures who are likely to
spread vital information to others. Formally, individuals are
nodes V in a social network, and we would like to influence
or activate as many of them as possible. This can be done by
initially seeding k nodes (where k  |V |). The seed nodes
activate their neighbors with some probability, who activate
their neighbors and so forth. Our goal is to identify k seeds
such that the maximal number of nodes is activated. This
is the classic influence maximization problem [Kempe et al.,
2003], that has received much attention in the literature.
In recent years, the influence maximization framework has
seen application to many social problems, such as HIV pre-
vention for homeless youth [Yadav et al., 2018; Wilder et
al., 2018b], public health awareness [Valente and Pumpuang,
2007], financial inclusion [Banerjee et al., 2013], and more.
Frequently, small and marginalized groups within a larger
community are those who benefit the most from attention and
assistance. It is important, then, to ensure that the allocation
of resources reflects and respects the diverse composition of
our communities, and that each group receives a fair alloca-
tion of the community’s resources. For instance, in the HIV
prevention domain we may wish to ensure that members of
racial minorities or of LGBTQ identity are not disproportion-
ately excluded; this is where our work comes in.
Our Contributions: This paper introduces the problem
of fair resource allocation in influence maximization. Our
first contribution is to propose fairness concepts for influ-
ence maximization. We start with a maximin concept inspired
by the legal notion of disparate impact; formally it requires
us to maximize the minimum fraction of nodes within each
group that are influenced. While intuitive and well-motivated,
this definition suffers from shortcomings that lead us to in-
troduce a second concept, diversity constraints. Roughly,
diversity constraints guarantee that every group receives in-
fluence commensurate with its “demand”, i.e., what it could
have generated on its own, based on a number of seeds pro-
portional to its size. Here, to compute a group’s demand, we
allow it a number of seeds proportional to its size, but re-
quire that it spreads influence using only nodes in the group.
Hence, a small but well connected group may have a better
claim for influence than a large but sparsely connected group.
Our second contribution is an algorithmic framework for
finding solutions that satisfy either fairness concept. While
the classical influence maximization problem is submodular
(and hence easily solved with a greedy algorithm), fairness
considerations produce strongly non-submodular objectives.
This renders standard techniques inapplicable. We show that
both fairness concepts can be reduced to multi-objective sub-
modular optimization problems, which are substantially more
complex. Our key algorithmic contribution is a new method
for general multi-objective submodular optimization which
has substantially better approximation guarantee than the cur-
rent best algorithm [Udwani, 2018], and often better runtime
as well. This result may be of independent interest.
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Our third contribution is an analytical exploration of the
price of group fairness in influence maximization, i.e., the
reduction in social welfare with respect to the unconstrained
influence maximization problem due to imposing a fairness
concept. We show that the price of diversity can be high in
general for both concepts and under a range of settings.
Our fourth contribution is an empirical study on real-world
social networks that have been used for a socially critical
application: HIV prevention for homeless youth. Our re-
sults show that standard influence maximization techniques
often cause substantial fairness violations by neglecting small
groups. Our proposed algorithm substantially reduces such
violations at relatively small cost to overall utility.
Related Work: Kempe et al. [2003] introduced influence
maximization and proved that since the objective is submod-
ular, greedily selecting nodes gives a
(
1− 1e
)
-optimal so-
lution. There has since been substantial interest among the
AI community both in developing more scalable algorithms
(see Li et al. [2018] for a recent survey) , as well as in ad-
dressing the challenges of deployment in public health set-
tings [Yadav et al., 2016; Wilder et al., 2018a]. Recently,
such algorithms have been used in real-world pilot tests for
HIV prevention amongst homeless youth [Yadav et al., 2018;
Wilder et al., 2018b], driving home the need to consider fair-
ness as influence maximization is applied in socially sensitive
domains. To our knowledge, no previous work considers fair-
ness specifically for influence maximization. The techniques
we introduce to optimize fairness metrics are related to re-
search on multi-objective submodular maximization (outside
the context of fairness), and we improve existing theoreti-
cal guarantees for this general problem [Chekuri et al., 2010;
Udwani, 2018].
Outside of influence maximization, the general idea of di-
versity as an optimization constraint has received consider-
able attention in recent years; it has been studied in multi-
winner elections (see [Bredereck et al., 2018; Faliszewski
et al., 2017] for an overview), resource allocation [Benab-
bou et al., 2018; Aghaei et al., 2019], and matching problems
[Ahmed et al., 2017; Hamada et al., 2017]. We note that
some of the above works (e.g. Ahmed et al. [2017] and Schu-
mann et al. [2017]) use a submodular objective function as
a means of achieving diversity; interestingly, while the clas-
sic influence maximization target function is submodular, it is
no longer so under diversity constraints. Group fairness has
been studied extensively in the voting theory literature, where
the objective is to identify a committee of k candidates that
will satisfy subsets of voters (see a comprehensive overview
in [Faliszewski et al., 2017]). There have also been several
works on group fairness in fair division, defining notions of
group envy-freeness [Conitzer et al., 2019; Fain et al., 2018;
Segal-Halevi and Suksompong, 2018; Todo et al., 2011],
and a group maximin share guarantee [Barman et al., 2019;
Suksompong, 2018].
2 Model
Agents are embedded in a social network G = (V,E). An
edge (i, j) ∈ E represents the ability for agent vi to influence
or activate vj . G may be undirected or directed.
Diversity: Each agent in our network may identify with
one or more groups within the larger population. These rep-
resent different ethnicities, genders, sexual orientations, or
other groups for which fair treatment is important. Our goal is
to maximize influence in a way such that each group receives
at least a “fair” share of influence (more on this below). Let
us designate these groups as C = {C1, . . . Cm}. Each group
Ci represents a non-empty subset of V, ∅ 6= Ci ⊆ V . Each
agent must belong to at least one group, but may belong to
multiple groups; i.e. C1 ∪ C2 ∪ . . . Cm = V . In particular,
this allows for the expression of intersectionality, where an
individual may be part of several minority groups.
Influence maximization: We model influence using the
independent cascade model [Kempe et al., 2003], the most
common model in the literature. All nodes begin in the in-
active state. The decision maker then selects k seed nodes
to activate. Each node that is activated makes one attempt to
activate each of its inactive neighbors; each attempt succeeds
independently with probability p. Newly activated nodes at-
tempt to activate their neighbors and so on, with the process
terminating once there are no new activations.
We define the influence of nodes A ⊆ V , denoted IG(A),
as the expected number of nodes activated by seeding A. Of
these, let IG,Ci(A) be the expected number of activated ver-
tices from Ci. Traditional influence maximization seeks a
set A, |A| ≤ k, maximizing IG(A). Using a slight abuse
of notation, let IG(k) be the maximum influence that can
be achieved by selected k seed nodes. That is, IG(k) =
max|A|=k IG(A). Analogously, we define IG,Ci(k) as the
maximum expected number of vertices from Ci that can be
activated by k seeds. We now propose two means of captur-
ing group fairness in influence maximization.
Maximin Fairness: Maximin Fairness captures the
straightforward goal of improving the conditions for the least
well-off groups. That is, we want to maximize the minimum
influence received by any of the groups, as proportional to
their population. This leads to the following utility function:
UMaximin(A) = min
i
IG,Ci(A)
|Ci|
Subject to this maximin constraint, we seek to maximize
overall influence. Thus, we define IMaximinG = IG(B) with
B = argmaxA⊆V,|A|=k U
Maximin(A). That is, IMaximinG is
the expected number of nodes activated by a seed configura-
tion that maximizes the minimum proportional influence re-
ceived by any group. This corresponds to the legal concept of
disparate impact, which roughly states that a group has been
unfairly treated if their “success rate” under a policy is sub-
stantially worse than other groups (see [Barocas and Selbst,
2016] for an overview). Therefore, maximin fairness may
be significant to governmental or community organizations
which are constrained to avoid this form of disparity. How-
ever, optimizing for equality of outcomes may be undesirable
when some groups are simply much better suited than others
to a network intervention. For instance, if one group is very
poorly connected, maximin fairness would require that large
number of nodes be spent trying to reach this group, even
though additional seeds have relatively small impact.
Diversity Constraints: We now propose an alternate fair-
ness concept by extending the notion of individual rationality
to Group Rationality. The key idea is that no group should
be better off by leaving the (influence maximization) game
with their proportional allocation of resources and allocating
them internally. For each group Ci, let ki = dk|Ci|/|V |e
be the number of seeds that would be fairly allocated to the
group Ci based on the group’s size within the larger popula-
tion, rounded up to remove any doubt that this group receives
a fair share. ki is the fair allocation of seeds to the group.
Let G[Ci] be the subgraph induced from G by the nodes
Ci. This represents the network formed by group Ci if they
were to separate from the original network. Now, we define
the group rational influence that each group Ci can expect
to receive as the number of nodes they expect to activate if
they left the network, with their fair allocation of ki seeds.
We denote this group rational influence for Ci as IG[Ci](ki).
Then, we devise a set of diversity constraints that any group
rational seeding configuration A with k seeds must satisfy:
IG,Ci(A) ≥ IG[Ci](ki),∀i. That is, the influence received by
each group is at least equal to what each group may accom-
plish on its own when given its fair share of ki seed nodes.
The diversity constraint objective function is to maximize
the expected number of nodes activated, subject to the above
diversity constraint. The utility for selecting seed nodes A is:
URational(A) =
{IG(A), if IG,Ci(A) ≥ IG[Ci](ki),∀i.
0, otherwise.
The maximum expected influence obtained via a group
rational seeding configuration A is called the ratio-
nal influence IRationalG = IG(B), where B =
argmaxA⊆V,|A|=k U
Rational(A).
Price of Fairness: To measure the cost of ensuring a fair
outcome for the diverse population, we will measure the Price
of Fairness, the ratio of optimal influence to the best achiev-
able influence under our two fairness criteria. Here optimal
influence IOPTG = IG(k), which is the maximum amount of
expected influence that can be obtained using any choice of k
seed nodes. We omit the subscript where the context is clear.
PoFRational =
IOPT
IRational PoF
Maximin =
IOPT
IMaximin
3 Optimization
The standard approach to influence maximization is based on
submodularity. Formally, a set function f on ground set V
is submodular if for every A ⊆ B ⊆ V and x ∈ V \ B,
f(A∪{x})−f(A) ≥ f(B∪{x})−f(B). This captures the
intuition that additional seeds provide diminishing returns.
However, both of our fairness concepts are easily shown to
violate this property (proofs are deferred to the appendix):
Theorem 3.1. UMaximin and URational are not submodular.
Hence, we cannot apply the greedy heuristic to group-fair
influence maximization. However, we now show that opti-
mizing either utility function reduces to multiobjective sub-
modular maximization, for which we we give an improved
algorithm below. Consider the following generic problem:
given monotone submodular functions f1...fm and corre-
sponding target values W1...Wm, find a set S satisfying
|S| ≤ k with fi(S) ≥ Wi for all i (under the promise that
such an S exists). Roughly, fi will be group i’s utility, and
Wi will be the utility that we want to guarantee for i. Suppose
that we have an algorithm for the above multiobjective prob-
lem. Then, we can optimize the maximin objective by letting
fi =
IG,Ci
|Ci| and binary searching for the largest W such that
fi ≥ W is feasible for all groups i. For diversity constraints,
we let fi = IG,Ci and set the target Wi = IG[Ci](ki). We
then add another objective function ftotal = IG representing
the combined utility and binary search for the highest value
Wtotal such that the targets W1...Wm,Wtotal are feasible. This
represents the largest achievable total utility, subject to di-
versity constraints. Having reduced both fairness concepts
to multiobjective submodular maximization, we now give an
improved algorithm for this core problem.
The multiobjective submodular problem was introduced by
Chekuri et al. [2010], who gave an algorithm which guaran-
tees fi ≥ (1− 1e )Wi for all i provided that the number of ob-
jectives m is smaller than the budget k (when m = Ω(k), the
problem is provably inapproximable [Krause et al., 2008]).
Unfortunately, this algorithm is of mostly theoretical inter-
est since it runs in time O(n8). Udwani [2018] recently in-
troduced a practically efficient algorithm; however it obtains
an asymptotic (1− 1e )2-approximation instead of the optimal(
1− 1e
)
. We remedy this gap by providing a practical algo-
rithm obtaining an asymptotic
(
1− 1e
)
-approximation (Al-
gorithm 1). Its runtime is comparable to, and under many
conditions faster than, the algorithm of [Udwani, 2018]. We
present the high-level idea behind the algorithm here, with
additional details present in the appendix.
Previous algorithms [Chekuri et al., 2010; Udwani, 2018]
start from a common template in submodular optimization,
which we also build on. The main idea is to relax the dis-
crete problem to a continuous space. For a given submodu-
lar function f , its multilinear extension F is defined on n-
dimensional vectors x where 0 ≤ xj ≤ 1 for all j. xj
represents the probability that item j is included in the set.
Formally, let S ∼ x denote a set which includes each j in-
dependently with probability xj . Then, we define F (x) =
ES∼x[f(S)], which can be evaluated using random samples.
The main challenge is to solve the continuous optimization
problem, which is where our technical contribution lies. Al-
gorithm 1 describes the high-level procedure, which runs our
continuous optimization subroutine (line 2) and then rounds
the output to a discrete set (line 3). Line 1, which ensures that
all items with value above a threshold τ are included in the
solution, is a technical detail needed to ensure the rounding
succeeds. The rounding process captured in lines 1 and 3 is
fairly standard and used by both previous algorithms [Chekuri
et al., 2010; Udwani, 2018]. Our main novelty lies in an im-
proved algorithm for the continuous problem, MULTIFW.
MULTIFW implements a Frank-Wolfe style algorithm to
simultaneously optimize the multilinear extensions F1...Fm
of the discrete objectives. The algorithm proceeds over T iter-
ations. Each iteration first identifies vt, a good feasible point
Algorithm 1 Multiobjective Optimization(γ, τ, T, T ′, η)
1: S1 = {j : fi({j}) ≥ τ for some i}
2: x =MULTIFW(k − |S1|, {γ (Wi − fi(S))}mi=1)
3: S2 =SWAPROUND(xint) //see [Chekuri et al., 2010]
4: return S1 ∪ S2
Algorithm 2 Multiobjective Frank-Wolfe(k, {Wi})
1: x0 = 0
2: for t = 1...T do
3: vt = S-SP-MD(x, {i : Wi − Fi(xt−1) ≥ })
4: xt = xt−1 + 1T v
t
5: return APPROXDECOMPOSITION(xT ) //see [Mirrokni
et al., 2017]
6: function S-SP-MD(x, I)
7: Initialize v s.t. ||v||1 = k and y ∈ ∆(I) arbitrarily
8: for ` = 1...T ′ do
9: Sample i ∼ y; set ∇ˆv = 1Wi−Fi(x)Aigrad(x)
10: Sample j ∼ v; ∇ˆy = k·diag
(
1
~W−~F (x)
)
Ajitem(x)
11: y = ye
−η∇ˆy
||ye−η∇ˆy ||1
12: v = k min{ve
η∇ˆ
v ,1}
||min{veη∇ˆv ,1}||1
in continuous space (Algorithm 2, line 3). Then, the current
solution xt is updated to add 1T v
t (line 4). The final output
is an approximate decomposition of xT into integral points,
produced using the algorithm of [Mirrokni et al., 2017]. This
is a technical step required for the rounding procedure.
The key challenge is to efficiently find a vt that makes
sufficient progress towards every objective simultaneously.
We accomplish this by introducing the subroutine S-SP-MD
(lines 6-12), which runs a carefully constructed version of
stochastic saddle-point mirror descent [Nemirovski et al.,
2009]. The idea is to find a v for which v · ∇iFi(xt−1) is
large enough for all objectives i. We convert this into the
saddle point problem of maximizing mini∈I v · ∇iFi(xt−1).
I denotes the set of objectives i where Wi − Fi(xt−1) ≥ 
(i.e., those where we still need to make progress). We let
∆(I) denote the set of all distributions over i. Our approach
only requires stochastic gradients, a necessary feature since
computing ∇iF (xt−1) exactly may be intractable when the
objective itself is randomized (as in influence maximization).
Specifically, we assume access to two gradient oracles.
First, a stochastic gradient oracle Aigrad for each multilinear
extension Fi. Given a point x, Aigrad(x) satisfies E[Aigrad] =
∇xFi(x). Second, a stochastic gradient oracle Ajitem cor-
responding to each item j ∈ [n] (in influence maximiza-
tion, the items are the potential seed nodes). Ajitem(x) sat-
isfies E[Ajitem(x)] =
[∇xjF1(x)...∇xjFm(x)]. We assume
that ||Aigrad(x)||∞, ||Ajitem(x)||∞ ≤ c for some constant c.
Linear-time oracles are available for many common submod-
ular maximization problems (e.g., coverage functions and fa-
cility location [Karimi et al., 2017]). Given such oracles, we
implement a stochastic mirror descent algorithm for the max-
imin problem. We can interpret the algorithm as solving a
game between the max player and the min player. The max
player controls v, while the min player controls a variable
y representing the weight put on each objective. Intuitively,
the min player will put large weights where the max player
is doing badly, forcing the max player to improve v. For-
mally, in each iteration, the players take exponentiated gradi-
ent updates (lines 8-12). The max player obtains a stochastic
gradient by sampling an objective with probability propor-
tional to the current weights y, while the min player samples
an item proportional to v and uses that item’s contribution to
estimate the max player’s current performance on each ob-
jective. We prove that these updates converge rapidly to the
optimal v. With the subroutine in hand, our main algorith-
mic result is the following guarantee for Algorithm 1. Here,
b = maxi,j fi({j}) is the maximum value of a single item.
Theorem 3.2. Given a feasible set of target values W1...Wn,
Algorithm 1 outputs a set S such that fi(S) ≥ (1 −
)
(
1− mk(1+′)3
) (
1− 1e
)
Wi −  with probability at least
1 − δ. Asymptotically as k → ∞, the approximation
ratio can be set to approach 1 − 1/e so long as m =
o(k log3 k). The algorithm requires O(nm) ′-accurate
value oracle calls, O(m bk
2
 log
1
δ ) -accurate value oracle
calls, O
(
bk4c2
5 log
(
n+ bkδ
))
calls to Agrad and Aitem, and
O
(
nk2b2
2 +
mk2b
 +
k3b2
2
)
additional work.
This says that Algorithm 1 asymptotically converges to
a
(
1− 1e
)
-approximation when the budget k is larger than
the number of objectives m (i.e., the conditions under which
the problem is approximable). All terms in the approxima-
tion ratio are identical to Udwani [2018], except that we im-
prove their factor
(
1− 1e
)2
to
(
1− 1e
)
. The runtime is also
identical apart from the time to solve the continuous prob-
lem (MULTIFW vs their corresponding subroutine). This is
difficult to compare since our respective algorithms use dif-
ferent oracles to access the functions. However, both kinds
of oracles can typically be (approximately) implemented in
timeO(n). Udwani’s algorithm usesO(n) oracle calls, while
our’s requires O(bk4c2 log n). For large-scale problems, n
typically grows much faster than k, b, and c (all of which are
often constants, or near-so). Hence, trading O(n2) runtime
for O(n log n) can represent a substantial improvement. We
present a more detailed discussion in the appendix.
To instantiate Algorithm 1 for influence maximization, we
just need to supply appropriate stochastic gradient oracles.
To our knowledge, no such oracles were previously known
for influence maximization, which is substantially more com-
plicated than other submodular problems because of addi-
tional randomness in the objective; naive extensions of pre-
vious methods require O(n2) time. We provide efficient
O(kn log n) time stochastic gradient oracles by introducing a
randomized method to simultaneously estimate many entries
of the gradient at once (details may be found in the appendix).
4 Price of Fairness
In this section, we show that both definitions for the Price of
Fairness can be unbounded; moreover, allowing nodes to join
multiple groups can, counter-intuitively, worsen the PoF. The
proofs in this section use undirected graphs. As they are more
restrictive, the result naturally hold for directed graphs.
Theorem 4.1. As n→∞ and p→ 0, PoFRational →∞.
Proof. We construct a graph G with two parts. In Part L, we
have s − 1 vertices all disjoint except for two vertices; label
one of these x3. In Part S, we have a star with s + 1 nodes.
Label a leaf node x1 and the central node x2. We define two
groups: C1 is comprised of the s degree-1 vertices of S, and
C2 for the remaining s vertices, which includes the vertices of
L and the central vertex x2 of the star. There are k = 2 seeds,
and since |C1| = |C2|, they each have a fair allocation of
k1 = k2 = 1 seeds. The figure below illustrates this network.
Since the subgraph induced by C1
is comprised of isolated vertices,
they have a rational allocation of
IG[C1](1) = 1. The subgraph induced
by C2 is a collection of isolated ver-
tices and a K2, its rational allocation is
IG[C2](1) = 1 + p.
We are interested in two seeding configurations: A =
{x1, x3} and B = {x2, x3}. We can verify that configu-
ration A is fair. The A activates 1 + p nodes in Part L,
and 1 + p + (s − 1)p2 in Part S, for a total of IG(A) =
2 + 2p+ (s− 1)p2.
Now consider configuration B. C1 receives ps influence,
and since p < 2n =
1
s , C1 does not receive its group rational
share of influence. However, we can verify that this seeding is
optimal. Part L receives (1+p) influence, and Part S receives
1 + ps. Therefore, IG(B) = 2 + p+ ps.
We may then calculate our Price of Fairness:
PoFRational =
IOPTG
IRationalG
=
2 + p+ ps
2 + 2p+ (s− 1)p2
And if we take the limit as n→∞, s→∞, PoF → 1/p.
Finally, as as p→ 0, PoF →∞.
The appendix details a similar result for Maximin Fairness:
Theorem 4.2. PoFMaximin is unbounded.
Frequently, an individual may identify with multiple
groups. Intuitively, we might expect such multi-group mem-
bership to improve the influence received by different groups
and make the group-fairness easier to achieve (see the ap-
pendix for an example). However, in this section, we show
that this is not always true, and giving even a single node
membership in a second group can cause the Price of Fair-
ness to worsen by an arbitrarily large amount.
Theorem 4.3. Given graphs G with groups C1 and C2, and
G′ with groups C ′1 and C
′
2, where G
′ = G, C ′1 = C1 and C
′
2
is obtained from C2 by the addition of one vertex x1 (x1 ∈
C1, x1 /∈ C2). It is possible for lim
n→∞
PoFRational
G′
PoFRationalG
=∞.
Proof. Consider a graph G with two components: one com-
ponent K contains 2 vertices joint by an edge, the other com-
ponent S is a star with s + 1 vertices (s ≥ 1/p). There are
two groups: C1 contains all degree-1 vertices from S and one
vertex from K; C2 contains the other vertex x1 from K and
the central vertex x2 from S. There is one seed (k = 1), and
the fair allocation of seeds to each group is k1 = k2 = 1.
G with Disjoint Groups. G′ with Overlapping Groups.
Since the induced subgraphs for both groups comprise only
of isolated nodes, the group rational influence for each group
is IG[C1] = IG[C2] = 1. Therefore, the seed set {x2} is both
fair and optimal, giving an expected influence of IG({x2}) =
1 + ps.
Now, let us modify G by letting x1 belong to both commu-
nities to obtain G′, and communities C ′1 and C
′
2. The group
rational influence for C ′2 remains the same (its members have
not changed) but IG′[C′1] has increased to 1 + p (by seeding
x1). In fact, this forces the fair allocation to seed x1 instead
of x2, for a fair influence of IG′({x1}) = 1 + p.
As n→∞, lim
n→∞
PoFRational
G′
PoFRationalG
= lim
s→∞
1+ps
1+p =∞.
A more technical construction can demonstrate a similar
result for Maximin Fairness, but only as p→ 13
−; that is, p <
1
3 as p approaches
1
3 . The proof is provided in the appendix.
Theorem 4.4. Given graphs G with groups C1 and C2, and
G′ with groupsC ′1 andC
′
2, whereG
′ = GC ′1 = C1 andC
′
2 is
obtained from C2 by the addition of one vertex x1 (x1 ∈ C1,
x1 /∈ C2). It is possible for limn→∞
p→ 13−
PoFMaximin
G′
PoFMaximinG
→∞.
5 Experimental results
We now investigate the empirical impact of considering fair-
ness in influence maximization. We start with experiments
on a set of four real-world social networks which have been
previously used for a socially critical application: HIV pre-
vention for homeless youth. Each network has 60-70 nodes,
and represents the real-world social connections between a
set of homeless youth surveyed in a major US city. Each
node in the network is associated with demographic informa-
tion: their birth sex, gender identity, race, and sexual orien-
tation. Each demographic attribute gives a partition of the
network into anywhere from 2 to 6 different groups. For each
partition, we compare three algorithms: the standard greedy
algorithm for influence maximization, which maximizes the
total expected influence (Greedy), Algorithm 1 used to en-
force diversity constraints (DC), and Algorithm 1 used to find
a maximin fair solution (Maximin). We set the propagation
probability to be p = 0.1 and fixed k = 15 seeds (varying
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Figure 1: Average performance on homeless youth social networks (top) and simulated Antelope Valley networks (bottom).
these parameters had little impact). We average over 30 runs
of the algorithms on each network (since all of the algorithms
use random simulations of influence propagation), with error
bars giving bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 1 (top) shows that the choice of solution concept
has a substantial impact on the results. For the diversity con-
straints case, we summarize the performance of each algo-
rithm by the mean percentage violation of the constraints over
all groups. For the maximin case, we directly report the min-
imum fraction influenced over all groups. We see that greedy
generates substantial unfairness according to either metric: it
generates the highest violations of diversity constraints, and
has the smallest minimum fraction influenced. Greedy actu-
ally obtains near-zero maximin value with respect to sexual
orientation. This results from it assigning one seed to a mi-
nority group in a single run and zero in others.
DC performs well across the board: it reduces constraint
violations by approximately 55-65% while also performing
competitively with respect to the maximin metric (even with-
out explicitly optimizing for it). As expected, the Maximin
algorithm generally obtains the best maximin value. DC ac-
tually attains slightly better maximin value for one attribute
(birthsex); however, the difference is within the confidence
intervals and reflects slight fluctuations in the approxima-
tion quality of the algorithms. However, Maximin performs
surprisingly poorly with respect to diversity constraint vio-
lations. This indicates that optimizing exclusively for equal
influence spread may force the algorithm to focus on poorly
connected groups which exhibit severe diminishing returns.
DC is able to attain almost as much influence in such groups
but is then permitted to focus its remaining budget for higher
impact. Interestingly, the price of fairness is relatively small
for both solution concepts, in the range 1.05-1.15 (though
it is higher for maximin than for DC). This indicates that
while standard influence maximization techniques can intro-
duce substantial fairness violations, mitigating such viola-
tions may be substantially less costly in real world networks
than the theoretical worst case would suggest.
Finally, the rightmost plot in the top row of Figure 1 ex-
plores an example with overlapping groups. Specifically, we
consider the race and birthsex attributes so that each node
belongs to two groups. Constraint violations are somewhat
higher than for either attribute individually, but the price of
fairness remains small (1.07 for DC and 1.13 for Maximin).
In Figure 1 (bottom), we examine 20 synthetic networks
used by Wilder et al. [2018c] to model an obesity preven-
tion intervention in the Antelope Valley region of California.
Each node in the network has a geographic region, ethnicity,
age, and gender, and nodes are more likely to connect to those
with similar attributes. Each network has 500 nodes and we
set k = 25. Overall the results are similar to the homeless
youth networks. One exception is the high price of fairness
that maximin suffers with respect to the “region” attribute
(over 1.4), but the other PoF values are relatively low (be-
low 1.2). We also observe that greedy obtains the (slightly)
best maximin performance for gender, likely because the net-
work is sufficiently well-mixed across genders that fairness is
not a significant concern (as confirmed by the extremely low
DC violations). Absent true fairness concerns, greedy may
perform slightly better since it solves a simpler optimization
problem. However, in the last figure, we examine overlapping
groups given by region and ethnicity and observe that greedy
actually obtains zero maximin value, indicating that there is
one group that it never reached across any run.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the problem of selecting key fig-
ures in a population to ensure the fair spread of vital infor-
mation across all groups. This problem modifies the clas-
sic influence maximization problem with additional fairness
provisions based on legal and game theoretic concepts. We
examine two methods for determining these provisions, and
show that the “Price of Fairness” for these provisions can be
unbounded. We propose an improved algorithm for multiob-
jective maximization to examine this problem on real world
data sets. We show that standard influence maximization
techniques often neglect smaller groups, and a diversity con-
straint based algorithm can ensure these groups receive a
fair allocation of resources at relatively little cost. As au-
tomated techniques become increasingly prevalent in society
and governance, our technique will help ensure that small and
marginalized groups are fairly treated.
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7 Appendix
A Price of fairness
Theorem 4.2. PoFM is unbounded.
Proof. Consider a graph G with two components: K which
consists of 2 connected vertices, and S which is a star with s+
1 nodes. Let the first group C1 have only one node in K. All
remaining nodes belong to the second group C2, including
one node x1 in K and the central node of the star x2. We
have k = 1 seed.
Example Undirected Net-
work with Unbounded PoF
under Maximin Fairness
It is clear that the optimal seeding configuration is to seed
x2, which gives IOPT = 1 + ps. However, this is not a max-
imin fair seeding, as C1 receives 0 influence. Instead, seeding
x1 is maximin fair, giving C1 p influence and C2 1 influence,
giving a maximin utility UMaximin({x1}) = min(p, 1s+2 ). In
this case, IMaximin = 1 + p.
As s → ∞, PoFMaximin = 1+ps1+p becomes unboundedly
large.
Theorem 3.1. UMaximin and URational are not submodular.
We divide the proof of this theorem into two parts:
Conjecture A. Maximin utility UMaximin is not submodular.
Proof. Let us consider a graph with 4 nodes {x, a, b, c}where
{x, a} form community C1 and {b, c} form community C2.
Let A = {a, b} and B = {a, b, c} be two possible seeding
configurations.
Example showing non-
submodularity of Maximin
Fairness
Notice that C1 receives 1 influence in both configurations,
which is weakly less than the influence received by C2, and
so, UMaximin(A) = UMaximin(B) = 1/2.
Now, consider adding x to the A and B. UMaximin(A ∪
{x}) = 1/2 since C2 remains incompletely seeded. But
UMaximin(B ∪ {x}) = 1 since both groups are fully
seeded.
Conjecture B. Group rational utility URational is not sub-
modular.
Proof. Recall the definition of group rational utility:
URational(A) =
{IG(A), if constraints satisfied
0, otherwise.
Let us consider the same graph as in Conjecture A with
4 nodes {x, a, b, c} where {x, a} form community C1, and
{b, c} forms community C2. k = 4 seeds are available, and
so therefore the group rational constraints are only satisfied
by seeding all vertices.
Let A = {a, b} and B = {a, b, c}. It is easy to verify
that URational(A) = URational(B) = URational(A ∪ {x}) =
0 since none of these satisfy all group rational constraints.
However, URational(B ∪ {x}) > 0, and so therefore f(A ∪
{x}) − f(A) < f(B ∪ {x}) − f(B) for A ⊆ B, which
contradicts the definition of submodularity.
Theorem 4.4. Give graphsG with groupsC1 andC2, andG′
with groups C ′1 and C
′
2, where G
′ = G C ′1 = C1 and C
′
2 is
obtained from C2 by the addition of one vertex x1 (x1 ∈ C1,
x1 /∈ C2. It is possible for limn→∞
p→ 13−
PoFMaximin
G′
PoFMaximinG
→∞.
Proof. Consider a graph G with two star components: S1
with s+ 1 vertices with a central node x1, and S2 with t+ 2
vertices with central node x2 (s > t). There are two groups:
C1 contains 2 vertices, x1 and a non-central node from S2;
C2 contains s+ t+ 1 remaining vertices, including x2. There
is one seed (k = 1), and a total of n = s+ t+ 3 nodes.
G with Disjoint Groups. G′ with Overlapping Groups.
It is easy to see that the Maximin configuration is to seed
x1, which gives C1 1 influence, and C2 ps influence. This
gives a Maximin influence IMaximinG = 1 + ps.1
Now, consider a modified graph G′ = G, but with our
groups modified by allowing x2 to belong to both communi-
ties. That is, C ′1 = C1 and C
′
2 = C2 ∪ {x2}. The Maximin
1We do not need to calculate UMaximin explicitly at any point in
this proof as it is not required for the proof to work.
configuration has two possibilities: either {x1} remains the
Maximin configuration, or {x2} becomes the new Maximin
configuration. In order for the latter case to be true, seeding
{x2} must provide higher proportional influence to the least
well-off group than seeding {x1}.
Seeding {x2} generates 1+p3 influence for C1, and 1+pts+t+1
influence for C2. Seeding {x1} generates 13 influence for C1,
and pss+t+1 . It can be shown that for p <
1
3 and t =
s
1−3p ,
these conditions are satisfied and {x2} is the Maximin con-
figuration, generating a total of IMaximinG′ = 1 + p(t+ 1).
Then,
lim
n→∞
PoFMaximin(G′)
PoFMaximin(G)
= lim
n→∞
IMaximin(G)
IMaximin(G′)
= lim
n→∞
1 + sp
1 + p(t+ 1)
= lim
n→∞
1 + sp
1 + p( s1−3p + 1)
= 1− 3p
And therefore, as p → 13
−, i.e. p approaches 13 from the
left, the addition of a node to a second group may cause the
Price of Maximin Fairness to worsen by an arbitrarily large
amount.
B Analysis of multiobjective submodular
maximization problem
Consider a collection of monotone submodular functions
f1...fm with corresponding multilinear extensions F1...Fm.
We will assume that the maximum singleton value of any
item in the ground set V is bounded as fi{v} ≤ b for all
i ∈ [m], v ∈ V . Suppose that we are given a target value
Wi for each fi and would like to find a set S with |S| ≤ k
which guarantees fi(S) ≥Wi for all i. We are promised that
such an S exists. We will give an approximation algorithm
for this problem which improves in terms of both runtime
and approximation ratio on the best current algorithms, given
by Udwani [Udwani, 2018], who in turn build on the work of
Chekuri et al. [Chekuri et al., 2010].
Our algorithm follows the overall template of [Udwani,
2018], which carries out three steps (given a precision level
).
1. Make a pass over the ground set, maintaining a set S1.
Add to S1 every item which has value at least 3Wi for
some fi.
2. Define P to be the uniform matroid polytope for budget
k − |S1|. Use a subroutine to find a point x ∈ P sat-
isfying Fi(x|xS1) ≥ α (Wi − fi(S1)) −  for all i and
some approximation ratio α. This is the key step where
we improve the runtime and approximation ratio.
3. Round x to a set S2 using the swap rounding algorithm
of [Chekuri et al., 2010] Output S1 ∪ S2.
Our primary technical contribution is an algorithm for the
second step which guarantees α =
(
1− 1e
)
. It uses access
to three kinds of stochastic oracles for the functions and their
multilinear extensions:
1. A stochastic value oracle for singletons Aival corre-
sponding to each fi. Given an item v, this oracle re-
turns a value Aival(v) with E
[Aival(S)] = fi({v}) and
Var
[Aival(S)] ≤ cval.
2. A stochastic gradient oracle Aigrad for each multilinear
extension Fi. Given a point x ∈ P , Aigrad(x) satisfies
E
[
Aigrad
]
= ∇xFi(x) and
∥∥∥Aigrad(x)∥∥∥∞ ≤ cgrad
3. A stochastic gradient oracleAjitem corresponding to each
item j ∈ [n]. Given a point x ∈ P , Ajitem(x) sat-
isfies E
[
Ajitem(x)
]
=
[∇xjF1(x)...∇xjFm(x)] and∥∥∥Ajitem(x)∥∥∥∞ ≤ citem. Note that this can be simulated
from the above oracle, but may sometimes admit more
efficient implementations.
We now analyze this algorithm. We start by recalling a
technical lemma on the smoothness of the multilinear exten-
sion:
Lemma A (Hassani et al. [Hassani et al., 2017], Lemma C.1).
For any monotone submodular set function f and its multilin-
ear extension F , ||∇F (x)−∇F (y)||∞ ≤ b||x− y||1 where
b = maxv∈V f({v}). That is, F is b-smooth with respect to
the `1 norm.
Lemma B. F is b-Lipschitz in the `1 norm.
Proof. Recall that ∇xjF (x) = ES∼x[f(S ∪ {j}) − f(S \{j})] CITE, where S ∼ x denotes including each j in
S independently with probability xj . By submodularity,
ES∼x[f(S ∪ {j}) − f(S \ {j})] ≤ f({j}) ≤ b. Hence,
||∇xjF (x)||∞ ≤ b which proves the lemma.
Next, we show a guarantee for the output of mirror descent
in step 2(a).
Lemma C. For some x ∈ P , suppose that there exists a
v∗ ∈ P such that v∗ · ∇Fi(x) ≥ Wi − Fi(x) for all
i = 1...m. Then, S-SP-MD returns a v satisfying v·∇Fi(x) ≥
(1−)(Wi−Fi(x))− for all i with probability 1−δ. There
are O
(
(cgrad
√
k logn+kcitem
√
logn)
2
4 log
1
δ
)
iterations, each re-
quiring one call to oracles Aigrad and Ajitem for some i and j,
and O(n+m) additional work.
Proof. Our objective is to find a v satisfying v ·Fi(x) ≥ (1−
)(Wi − Fi(x))− , under the guarantee that such a v exists.
Note that we call S-SP-MD only on the set of indices I where
Wi − Fi(x) ≥ . For all other indices, where the current
solution is already within  of the target, monotonicity of the
Fi guarantees that v · Fi(x) ≥ 0 ≥Wi − Fi(x)− .
The feasibility problem on the groups in I is equivalent to
solving maxmin problem
max
v∈P
min
i∈I
v · ∇Fi(x)
Wi − Fi(x)
To see this, let OPT denote the optimal value for the
maxmin problem; we are guaranteed OPT ≥ 1. If we have
v with maxmin value at least OPT − , then v satisfies
v · ∇Fi(x) ≥ (1− )(Wi − Fi(x)) ∀i ∈ I
We now prove that S-SP-MD produces a v with maxmin
value at least OPT − . Let A be a matrix where column i
is ∇Fi(x)Wi−Fi(x) for each i ∈ I, and define g(v, y) = v>Ay. Let
∆(I) be the |I|-dimensional probability simplex. We would
like to solve the problem
max
v∈P
min
y∈∆(I)
g(v, y)
which is easily seen to be equivalent to the original maxmin
problem.
We will solve the above saddle point problem by running
stochastic saddle point mirror descent with the negative en-
tropy mirror map on the function g. We obtain stochastic
estimates of ∇vg(v, y) and ∇yg(v, y) via calls to input the
oracles. First, note that
∇vg(v, y) = Ay =
∑
i∈I
yiA·,i = E
i∼y
[A·,i]
where i ∼ y denotes drawing index i with probability yi
(recall that y ∈ ∆(I) is a probability distribution). Hence,
we can obtain an estimate ∇ˆv of ∇vg(v, y) by sampling
i ∼ y and returning 1Wi−Fi(x)Aigrad. We are guaranteed∥∥∥∇ˆv∥∥∥∞ ≤ cgradWi−Fi(x) ≤ cgrad . We take a similar strategy for
∇yg(v, y): v>A = k
(
1
kv
)
Aˆ = kEj∼ 1k v[vjAj ] (since
1
kvj
is a probability distribution). Hence, we can sample j ∼ 1kv
and return ∇ˆy = k · diag
(
1
~W−~F (x)
)
Ajitem(x). This satisfies∥∥∥∇ˆy∥∥∥∞ ≤ k citem.
Note that we can bound the diameter of P with respect
to the mirror map by
√
k log n (see [Hassani et al., 2017])
and the diameter of ∆m by
√
logm (see [Nemirovski et al.,
2009]). We will run mirror descent for T ′ iterations. Let x¯ =
1
T ′
∑T ′
t=1 x
t and y¯ = 1T ′
∑T ′
t=1 y
t. Now applying Proposition
3.2 of Nemirovski et al. [Nemirovski et al., 2009] implies that
after T ′ iterations we have
Pr
[
max
v∈P
g(v, y¯)− min
y∈∆(I)
g(v¯, y) ≥
(8 + 2Ω)
√
5
(
cgrad
√
k log n+ kcitem
√
log n
)

√
T
]
≤ 2 exp(−Ω)
and so taking T ′ = O
(
(cgrad
√
k logn+kcitem
√
logn)
2
log 1δ
4
)
ensures that
min
y∈∆(I)
g(v¯, y) ≥ max
v∈P
min
y∈∆(I)
g(v, y)− .
holds with probability at least 1− δ.
Theorem D. Suppose that there exists some x ∈ P satisfying
Fi(x) ≥ Wi for all i = 1...m. Then, after T = bk2 itera-
tions, the algorithm returns a point xT satisfying Fi(xT ) ≥
(1− ) (1− 1e)Wi −  for all i. Each iteration requires one
call to mirror descent at success probability δ′ = δbk2 and
precision level ′ = 2 , O(m) -accurate value oracle calls,
and O(n) additional work.
Proof. We analyze the progress that the algorithm makes
with respect to each Fi over a single step t. Using the guar-
antee for the subroutine mirror descent (run with a precision
level 1 to be set below), and assuming that the values {Wi}
are feasible, we have with probability at least 1− δ
Fi(x
t)− Fi(xt−1)
≥ 1
T
[∇Fi(xt−1) · vt]− b
2
∥∥xt − xt−1∥∥2
1
(Lemma A)
≥ 1
T
[∇Fi(xt−1) · vt]− bk2
2T 2
(`1 diameter of P)
≥ 1
T
(
(1− 1)(Wi − Fi(xt−1))− 1
)− bk2
2T 2
(Lemma C)
which implies
Wi − Fi(xt) ≤
(
1− 1− 1
T
)[
Wi − Fi(xt−1)
]
+
1
T
+
bk2
2T 2
and so after T steps
Wi − Fi(xT ) ≤
(
1− 1− 1
T
)T [
Wi − Fi(x0)
]
+ 1 +
bk2
2T
≤ 1
e1−1
Wi + 1 +
bk2
2T
holds with probability at least 1 − Tδ via union bound.
Taking 1 = 2 , T =
bk2
 , and running mirror descent with
success probability δT at each iteration ensures that
Fi(x
T ) ≥
(
1− 1
e1−
)
Wi − 
≥ (1− )
(
1− 1
e
)
Wi − 
holds for all i with probability at least 1 − δ, which com-
pletes the guarantee for the solution quality. To obtain the
bound on additional work done by the algorithm, we note that
the only operation performed besides calling mirror descent
is adding vt to the current iterate, which takes timeO(n).
Theorem E. Given a feasible set of target values W1...Wn,
Algorithm 1 outputs a set S such that fi(S) ≥ (1 −
)
(
1− mk(1+′)3
) (
1− 1e
)
Wi −  with probability at least
1 − δ. Asymptotically as k → ∞, the approximation
ratio can be set to approach 1 − 1/e so long as m =
o(k log3 k). The algorithm requires O(nm) ′-accurate
value oracle calls, O(m bk
2
 log
1
δ ) -accurate value oracle
calls, O
(
bk4c2
5 log
(
n+ bkδ
))
calls to Agrad and Aitem, and
O
(
nk2b2
2 +
mk2b
 +
k3b2
2
)
additional work.
Proof. THRESHOLDINCLUDE produces a set S1 for which
each item j ∈ S1 satisfies fi({j}) ≥ Wi(1 + ′)3 for
some i, and any j 6∈ S1 satisfies fi({j}) ≤ Wi3 for
all i. Note that there can be at most 1(1+′)3 items with
fi({j}) ≥Wi(1 + ′)3 for any given i (combining submod-
ularity with our WLOG assumption that fi is upper bounded
by Wi). Hence, |S1| ≤ m(1+′)3 . Define k1 = k − |S1|.
Now we lower bound the marginal gain of the fractional
vector x returned by MULTIOBJECTIVEFW. So long as the
target values {k1k (Wi − fi(S1))} are feasible, we are guar-
anteed that Fi(x|S1) ≥ k1k
(
1− 1e
)
(Wi − fi(S1)) − . for
all i. To see feasibility, let S∗ be the promised set satisfy-
ing the overall feasibility problem (i.e., fi(S∗) ≥ Wi for all
i). Let xS denote the indicator vector of the set S. We have
that |S∗ \ S1| ≤ k, and Fi(xS∗\S1 |xS1) = fi(S∗|S1) ≥
Wi− fi(S1). Using Corollary 3 of [Udwani, 2018], the point
x′ = k1k xS∗\S1 satisfies Fi(x
′|xS1) ≥ k1k (Wi − fi(S1)). x′
is also feasible for the continuous problem since ||x′||1 ≤
k1. Now applying Theorem D guarantees that Fi(x|S1) ≥
k1
k
(
1− 1e
)
(Wi − fi(S1))−  with probability at least 1− δ.
Lastly, we need to handle the rounding process. We first
take the point x and approximately decompose it into a con-
vex combination of integral points of P . This is done us-
ing the algorithm of Mirrokni et al. [Mirrokni et al., 2017],
which produces a point xint satisfying ||xint − x||1 ≤ 
along with a decomposition of xint into O(k
2
2 ) integral points
of P ([Mirrokni et al., 2017], Proposition 5.1). If we
run this algorithm with precision level b , Lemma B guar-
antees that |Fi(xint) − Fi(x)| ≤  for all i and hence
Fi(xint|S1) ≥ k1k
(
1− 1e
)
(Wi − fi(S1)) − 2. Applying
Lemma 2 of [Udwani, 2018] (who summarize the guarantee
for swap rounding proved by [Chekuri et al., 2010]), carry-
ing out O
(
log 1δ
)
iterations of swap rounding and taking the
best outcome produces a set S2 which satisfies f(S2|S1) ≥
(1−)k1k
(
1− 1e
)
(Wi − fi(S1))−3with probability at least
1 − δ, provided that the best outcome is determined by call-
ing a value oracle with precision level . Adding up the final
guarantee, we have
f(S) = f(S1 ∪ S2)
= f(S1) + f(S2|S1)
≥ (1− )k1
k
(
1− 1
e
)
W1 − 3
≥ (1− )
(
1− m
k3(1 + ′)
)(
1− 1
e
)
W1 − 2
and now rescaling  by a factor 13 gives the final approx-
imation guarantee. The asymptotic 1 − 1/e approximation
follows by setting  as in [Udwani, 2018].
We now add up the final runtime. The first threshold-
ing step requires n value oracle calls to each of the m
objectives at precision level ′. MULTIOBJECTIVEFW re-
quires bk
2
 iterations, each of which calls mirror descent
once. Each invocation of mirror descent requires a total of
O
(
1
4
(
cgrad
√
k log n+ citemk
√
log n
)2
log bkδ
)
oracle calls.
Recalling that c = max{citem, cgrad}, this is upper bounded
by O
(
c2k2
4 log
(
n+ bkδ
))
. Each iteration of MULTIOBJEC-
TIVEFW also uses m value oracle calls at precision level .
Finally, each iteration uses additionalO(n+m) overhead, for
a total of O
(
(n+m)k2b

)
. In the rounding procedure, we first
need to involve APPROXIMATECARATHEODORY with preci-
sion level b , which per Proposition 5.1 of [Mirrokni et al.,
2017] requires k
2b2
 iterations, and one linear maximization
overP per iteration. SinceP is the uniform matroid polytope,
each linear maximization takes time O(n), and so this stage
contributes time O
(
nk2b2

)
. Lastly, we have the O
(
log 1δ
)
iterations of swap rounding. Since xint was decomposed into
k2b2
2 integral points, swap rounding takes time
k3b2
2 for each
iteration [Chekuri et al., 2010]. We also need one -accurate
value oracle call to each of the objective functions per itera-
tion so that we can select the (approximately) best set. Com-
bining these bounds results in the final stated runtime.
C Efficient stochastic gradient estimates
We now give efficient implementations for the ora-
cles Agrad and Aitem. They run in combined time
O
(
k (|V |+ |E|) log2 |V |δ
)
time, where the operation suc-
ceeds with probability 1− δ. Our implementations guarantee
c ≤ 2b whenever they succeed.
We use a representation the influence maximization objec-
tive as the expectation over a set of deterministic submodu-
lar functions. Specifically, we can view the independent cas-
cade model as specifying a distribution over live-edge graphs
[Kempe et al., 2003] where each edge is present with prob-
ability p and absent otherwise (where all events are indepen-
dent). Let ξ denote a graph realized from this process, which
we will denote ξ ∼ P . For a fixed ξ, the influence spread of a
given seed set S is just the number of nodes which are reach-
able from S via only the edges present in ξ. We will denote
this quantity by f(S, ξ), where f(S) = Eξ∼P [f(S, ξ)].
The starting point is to recall that for any group’s utility
function fi, the gradients of the multilinear extension Fi sat-
isfy
∇xjFi = E
S∼x
[fi(S ∪ {j})− fi(S \ {j})]
= E
S∼x,ξ∼P
[fi(S ∪ {j}, ξ)− fi(S \ {j}, ξ)], (1)
which follows from the definition of the multilinear exten-
sion [Chekuri et al., 2010]. Note that for any fixed i and xj ,
we can obtain a stochastic estimate of this quantity in time
O(|V |+|E|) by first drawing a set S ∼ x, simulating the cas-
cade process, and counting the number of of nodes reached
with and without item j. By submodularity, the resulting es-
timate satisfies f(S ∪ {j}, ξ) − f(S \ {j}, ξ) ≤ b for any
S and ξ. Naively repeating this process over all i, j would
hence require time O(|V |(|V |+ |E|)m). We now show how
to implement the required oracles by drawing a number of
samples that scales only with k log |V | instead of |V |.
ImplementingAitem is simpler because we only need to es-
timate
[∇xjF1(x)...∇xjFm(x)] for a single fixed xj . Hence,
we can draw a single S, ξ, count the number of nodes reach-
able in each group under ξ with set S \ {j}, and then count
the number of nodes reachable with set S ∪ {j}. This takes
time O (|V |+ |E|).
Efficiently implementing Agrad is more difficult since we
need to simultaneously estimate ∇Fi with respect to every
xj ; hence, naive enumeration would take O(|V |2) time. We
now detail our strategy. We start by considering a given sam-
ple (S, ξ) and show how to estimate the marginal contribution
fi(S∪{j}, ξ)−fi(S, ξ) for a given i and and all j 6∈ S in total
runtime O
(
(|V |+ |E|) log |V |δ
)
. We first remove all nodes
from G that are reachable from S under ξ, which takes time
O (|V |+ |E|). Any node removed in this stage has marginal
contribution 0. Next, we remove all nodes that are isolated
in the remaining subgraph and assign them marginal contri-
bution 1 if they are part of group i. This stage takes time
O(|V |).
Now we deal with the remaining nodes. Here, determining
their marginal contribution of node v to group i amounts to
estimating the number of nodes of group i which are reach-
able from v in ξ. We use the size estimation framework of
Cohen [Cohen, 1997], which allows us to simultaneously pro-
duce an unbiased estimate of every remaining node’s contri-
bution to group i in timeO (|E|). We apply the weighted ver-
sion of the estimator, where every node in group i has weight
1 and all other nodes have weight 0. We take O(
(
log |V |δ
)
independent repetitions of the estimation process, resulting
in O
(
|E| log |V |δ
)
runtime. For a given group i, and using `
repetitions, Cohen’s estimator produces an estimate ∆(v) for
each node which satisfies
1. E[∆(V )] = fi({v}|S)
2. Pr [|∆(v)− fi({v}|S)| ≥ fi({v}|S)] ≤ e−Ω(
2`) for
any 0 ≤  ≤ 1
We fix  = 1 as an arbitrary constant and use ` =
O
(
log |V |δ
)
. This allows us to use union bound combined
with the second property of the estimator to argue that over
all nodes combined
Pr [∆(v) ≥ 2b] ≤ Pr [∆(v) ≥ 2fi({v}|S)] ≤ δ
and so the resulting gradients will satisfy our stated bounds
on citem and cgrad with high probability.
Our overall strategy is to generate enough samples that ev-
ery node is missing from S in at least one of them. Then,
we can use a node’s marginal contribution in the sample from
which it missing as its gradient estimate. Note that a node
j is absent from any given sample with probability 1 − xj .
Given budget k, at most k
1− 1k+1
= k + 1 nodes can have
xj ≥ 1 − 1k+1 . For any such node, we can explicitly esti-
mate a sample of Equation 1 using O (|V |+ |E|) time per
node, for O (k (|V |+ |E|)) total. For the remaining nodes, a
simple argument shows that taking (k+ 1) log |V |δ samples is
sufficient to ensure that each node is missing from at least one
sample with combined probability 1−δ. Summing up, the to-
tal runtime to implementAgrad isO
(
k (|V |+ |E|) log2 |V |δ
)
.
D Runtime comparison with previous work
The best previous algorithm for multiobjective submodular
maximization [Udwani, 2018] uses the same overall frame-
work as us, but uses a MWU algorithm for the second stage
(the continuous maximization problem). The MWU algo-
rithm runs O
(
m
2
)
iterations, where each iteration requires a
call to a greedy algorithm that maximizes a weighted com-
bination of the fi. Using the best implementation of the
greedy algorithm [Badanidiyuru and Vondra´k, 2014]2 re-
quires O
(
n
 log
n

)
value oracle calls, for O
(
n
3 logm log
n

)
such calls in total. By comparison, our algorithm accesses
the function through calls to the gradient oracles Aitem andAgrad. It makes a number of calls to these oracles which
is only logarithmic in n, scaling as O
(
bc2k4
3 log
(
n+ bkδ
))
.
Since gradient oracle calls can typically be implemented in
similar asymptotic runtime to value oracle calls for common
classes of functions (as we have demonstrated for influence
maximization), our algorithm effectively saves a factor O(n)
runtime in exchange for worse dependence on k and b. Since
we expect n to grow much faster than k or b (in many typical
applications, b is a small constant [Hassani et al., 2017]), this
is often an improvement in asymptotic runtime. For influence
maximization in particular, it is easy to see that a value ora-
cle call for a given group cannot be implemented in less than
O(|V | + |E|) time, which matches (up to log factors) our
stochastic gradient oracle’s dependence on the graph size.
2While there are efficient special-purpose techniques for influ-
ence maximization on a given graph, it is not obvious how to adapt
them to deal with the weighted combination of group objectives.
